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Standard in Practice 
Allan H. Meltzer and Saranna Robinson 
During her active career as a monetary economist and historian, Anna 
Schwartz returned to the history of monetary standards many times. 
In  the famed A  Monetary  History of the  United States,  1867-1960 
(Friedman and Schwartz 1963), in her work as executive director of 
the 1981-82  U.S. Gold Commission (Commission on the Role of Gold 
in  the Domestic and International  Monetary Systems  1982), in  her 
introduction  to the National  Bureau volume A Retrospective on  the 
Classical Gold Standard, 1821-1931  (Bordo and Schwartz 1984), and 
in books and papers on British and U.S. monetary history before and 
after these volumes, she has both summarized past knowledge with 
careful attention to detail and added important pieces to our under- 
standing of  the way monetary systems work in practice. 
One issue to which she and others have returned many times is the 
relative welfare gain or loss under alternative standards. Properly so; 
a main task of economic historians and empirical scientists is to test 
the predictions and implications of economic theory. Since theory does 
not give an unqualified prediction about the welfare benefits of different 
standards, evidence on the comparative performance under different 
standards is required to reach a judgment. 
Measures of economic welfare or welfare loss usually include the 
growth rate of aggregate or per capita (or per family) consumption or 
output, the rates of actual and unanticipated inflation, and the risks or 
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uncertainty that individuals bear. We  use unanticipated  variability of 
prices and output as measures of uncertainty and actual inflation as a 
measure of the deviation from the optimal rate of inflation. Eichengreen 
(1985,6 and 9) includes the stability of real and nominal exchange rates 
under the gold standard as one of  the benefits of the standard. While 
the evidence of greater real exchange rate stability under fixed exchange 
rates seems clear-cut, the welfare implications are less clear.  I  Given 
the same policy rules and policy actions, greater stability of real ex- 
change rates under the gold standard may be achieved at the cost of 
greater variability in output or employment. This will  be true if  the 
alternative to exchange rate adjustment is adjustment of relative costs 
of production and relative prices when wages, costs of production, or 
some prices are slow to adjust. We, therefore, exclude exchange rate 
stability from the comparison and focus attention on the variability of 
unanticipated output, prices, inflalion, and the growth rate of output.2 
The following section discusses previous findings about the stability 
of  prices and output and the rates of inflation and growth. We  then 
consider  the  comparative experience of  the  seven countries  in  our 
sample under the classical gold standard. Bretton Woods, and the fluc- 
tuating exchange rate regime. Like most previous  comparisons, our 
first comparisons are based on actual values or their rates of change. 
The variability of unanticipated changes in prices and output under the 
three regimes is a more relevant measure of variability and uncertainty. 
We  obtain measures of  uncertainty about the levels and growth rates 
of output and prices using a multistate Kalman filter based on the work 
of  Bomhoff (1983) and Kool (1983). Subsequent sections describe our 
procedures,  present some estimates of  comparative uncertainty, and 
consider the relation between shocks in Britain and the United States 
under the gold standard. A conclusion completes the paper. 
4.1  Previous Evidence 
Bordo (1986) summarizes previous  work on the stability of  prices 
and output under the gold standard. For prices, there is strong evidence 
of reversion to a mean value. As is well known, the price level in most 
countries shows little trend under the gold standard if one chooses a 
period long enough for alternating periods of inflation and deflation to 
occur. This is true of the seven countries that we consider here; average 
rates of  inflation under  the  classical  gold  standard  range from 0.08 
percent to 1.  I  percent.3 
While the long-term stability of the price level under the gold standard 
is often commented on favorably, it is not clear that ex post stability 
is desirable independently  of  the way  in which it is achieved. Alter- 
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do not have the same welfare implications as small, transitory fluctua- 
tions around a constant expected or average price leveL4 Long-term 
price stability achieved through canceling wartime inflations by severe 
postwar deflations imposes costs on consumers and producers,  and 
particularly so, if  the timing or magnitude of both the inflations and 
deflations is uncertain.  A policy of maintaining expected stability of 
commodity prices, instead of stability of the nominal gold price, would 
have avoided postwar deflations by revaluing gold. In place of the long- 
term commitment to a fixed nominal exchange rate of domestic money 
for gold, countries could have made a commitment to a stable expected 
price level. 
Cooper (1982) computed the rates of price change in four countries 
using the wholesale price index numbers available for the period. Cooper 
includes the years 1816 to 1913 but, for much of this period, major coun- 
tries were not on the gold standard. We  start the classical gold standard 
period in the 1870s when several countries chose to buy and sell gold at 
a fixed price, and we end the period in  1913, the last prewar year. Al- 
though many countries fixed their currencies to gold in the 1920s, the 
rules of the system differed and the commitment was weaker. Cooper’s 
data for the years 1873-96 and 1896- 1913 are shown in table 4.1. 
The cumulative movement in each period is relatively large, although 
the average annual  rate of  change in the first two periods is 2 or 3 
percent. For comparison, we have included the percentage change in 
consumer prices for the same four countries during 1957-70,  approx- 
imately the years that the Bretton Woods system had convertible cur- 
rencies. The comparison shows that while the average annual rates of 
change under the gold standard are similar (or lower) for some coun- 
tries, they are higher for others. 
The key difference between the price movements in the earlier and 
later periods is that there is no evidence of mean reversion in postwar 
data following Bretton Woods. Few would  argue, however,  that the 
deflations of  1920-21  or 1929-33,  or the prior deflations in  the nine- 
teenth century that contributed to the reversions, reduced welfare less 
than the inflation of the 1970s. 
Table 4.1  Percentage Change of  Price Indexes, Four Countries, 1873-1913 
and 1957-70 
Years  United States  United Kingdom  Germany  France 






-  45  -  40  -  45 
39  45  45 
55  36  88 
Source: Cooper (1982, 9); Economic Report ofrhe President (1971. 306). 166  Allan H. MeltzedSaranna Robinson 
A major, unresolved  issue is the degree to which people could an- 
ticipate that inflation or deflation would occur. Bond yields are often 
taken as evidence of expected stability under the gold standard. Ma- 
caulay’s series on railroad bond yields declines during the deflation of 
the 1870s and 1880s but continues to decline until  1899 or 1901, after 
gold, money, and prices had started to rise. The Macaulay yields are 
higher during the deflation of the 1870s than at the start of World War 
I, despite nearly twenty years of inflation. Although other factors may 
have been at work, the raw data give no support to the proposition 
that bond yields are a summary measure of anticipated  price move- 
ments under the gold standard. 
Rockoff (1984) presents some evidence suggesting that there was a 
basis for belief that prices would return to some mean value. His study 
considers the relation of  gold mining and technological change in gold 
extraction to the relative price of gold. He concludes, tentatively, that 
many of the new gold discoveries and technical changes in methods of 
extraction were the result of an earlier rise in the relative price of gold. 
On his interpretation, long-term price movements for the period  1821 
to 1914 appear to be the result of changes in demand along a relatively 
elastic long-run gold supply curve. Rockoff’s evidence suggests a long- 
term, gradual reversion of  commodity prices operating on the relative 
price  of  gold  and  the supply  of  gold.5 This mechanism, relying  on 
changes in  the resources devoted to gold  production  and  storage to 
maintain long-term price stability, is not clearly superior to other means 
of  maintaining  price stability. The fact that the mechanism  operates 
with a lag of decades raises, again, the issue of whether it was antic- 
ipated in a sense relevant for people allocating wealth and choosing to 
consume or save at the time. Further, there is no reason to presume 
that people  believed that reversion  would  occur. The rate at which 
mines would be discovered was highly uncertain. Countries could change 
the gold reserve ratio or leave the gold standard. Some countries did 
leave the standard, even in the 1870 to 1913 period that we study below. 
Few  studies of comparative variability  are available. Bordo (1981) 
compared the standard deviation and coefficient of  variation for the 
price level under the gold standard and after World War 11.  He found 
that these measures of  price  variability  were higher  under the gold 
standard for the United  States but  lower for the  United  Kingdom. 
Bordo does not separate postwar data into fixed and fluctuating rate 
periods. 
Schwartz (1986) notes that the long-term price  stability under the 
gold standard, which  seems so apparent with hindsight, was not ap- 
parent  to leading  economists of  the period.  “What  occasioned the 
criticism  [of the gold  standard] was  precisely  the long-term secular 
price movements-the  rise in prices associated with the mid-nineteenth 167  Stability Under the Gold Standard in Practice 
century gold discoveries and the decline in prices  that began  in the 
1870s under an expanding international gold standard” (p. 56). Jevons, 
Marshall, and Fisher (among others) not only criticized price instability 
under the gold standard, but proposed alternative standards to increase 
stability. At the minimum, this suggests that these economists did not 
regard the standard as an optimal arrangement to achieve stability of 
prices and output. 
Schwartz’s review of the pro and con arguments concludes that, 
while the classical gold standard did not achieve superior price stability, 
it may have produced greater long-term price predictability than achieved 
under alternative systems. To  support this conclusion, she points to 
the prevalence of long-term contracts. It is not clear, however,  that 
contracts are now significantly shorter and, if  they are, whether the 
change reflects  a  change in  opportunities or a change in  long-term 
uncertainty. Klein (1976) reaches a conclusion similar to Schwartz’s 
about predictability. The conclusion is based mainly on his finding, for 
the United States, that the serial correlation of price changes is sub- 
stantially higher  in the postwar years than  under the gold  standard. 
With increased serial correlation, people observing price changes can 
reliably extrapolate the direction of change given the knowledge of the 
serial correlation (and confidence that it will remain). Klein’s measure 
of long-term price level predictability under the gold standard shows 
relatively little difference from the postwar period, however, while his 
measure of variability  of prices shows a considerable decline in the 
postwar years. Further, we show in table 4.4 below that serial corre- 
lation of  price changes in the United States under fluctuating rates is 
lower than under the gold standard. 
The main argument for long-term predictability under the gold stan- 
dard is that the commitment to the standard was credible, at least in 
those countries that maintained the standard at the same nominal price 
of  gold whenever they were on the standard. The costs of long-term 
predictability, then, must include the costs of Britain’s return to gold 
in 1821 and 1925 at the established parity. Our impression is that most 
of the literature regards this cost as higher than the benefit. 
A major problem with the classical gold standard is that the system 
magnifies  shocks to aggregate demand. An inflow of  gold  increases 
aggregate demand and supplies reserves that permit an expansion of 
loans and money. Monetary expansion augments the initial shock. Money 
growth rises in periods of economic expansion and falls in contraction. 
With slow adjustment of  prices and costs of production, the effects of 
rising and falling growth rates of money is, first, an output and only 
later on prices and gold flows. 
A second problem arises from gold holding. The right to own gold 
is a valuable right that may protect wealthowners from inflationary and 168  Allan H. MeltzedSaranna Robinson 
confiscatory  actions of  government.  Society bears a cost, however; 
when gold is held in place of  capital, society's capital stock is lower, 
and per capita output is smaller. The fears that drive wealthowners to 
seek protection in gold holding are costly to society. 
The principal virtue claimed for long-term price predictability is that 
knowledge that the price level will return to a mean value encourages 
long-term investment. The classical gold standard regime saw the ex- 
pansion of railroads, steel mills, and other durable capital. The more 
inflationary postwar regime has also seen the building of durable capital, 
including steel mills, in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, and elsewhere. 
Western Europe rebuilt its infrastructure. In the United States, durable 
capital took such forms as housing, office buildings, shopping centers, 
airline terminals, roads, bridges, and university buildings. While we do 
not dismiss  arguments relating price  predictability  to investment in 
durable capital, we would like a clearer statement of  the benefits of 
long-term price predictability and more evidence that the gold standard 
produced these benefits. 
Bordo (1981) compared the growth rates and variability of output in 
the United Kingdom and the United States for 1870-1913  and 1946- 
79. He found that the average growth rate was higher, and the variability 
lower, in the later period for both countries. National Bureau data on 
business cycles expansions and contractions for the United States show 
that  recessions  were  longer and expansions shorter under  the  gold 
standard than under the postwar regimes. Peacetime expansions and 
contractions from  1854 to  1919  are approximately  equal: 24  and 22 
months,  respectively.  From  1945  to  1982. peacetime expansions on 
average are three times the length of contractions: 34  and  11 months, 
respectively. The current expansion, beginning in  1982, will raise the 
average for postwar peacetime expansions by at least four months. 
A commonly cited disadvantage of the gold standard and other fixed 
rate regimes is that the standard transmits shocks internationally. Eas- 
ton (1984) computed the correlations between deviations from the trend 
of output in eight countries under the gold standard. He found moderate 
correlation of  the deviations; some are negative, some positive. Cor- 
relations of 0.5 or 0.6 between Denmark and Norway or Sweden, and 
between Canada and the United States, suggest a high degree of trans- 
mission. There is, then, some evidence of the transmission of  shocks 
across countries, as expected, but not all shocks are positive shocks 
to aggregate demand and output that produce positive correlation of 
shocks. Positive correlations may also result from transmission of neg- 
ative shocks from one country to another. Further, Easton's method 
assumes that trends are constant. Below, we compute stochastic trends 
and deviations from such trends. We  find very little evidence of positive 
correlation of shocks across countries under the gold standard. 169  Stability Under the Gold Standard in Practice 
Meltzer (1 984) compared the variability of unanticipated shocks to 
prices and output in the United States under six monetary regimes from 
1890 to 1980. He found that variability and uncertainty were greater 
under the two gold standard regimes, 1890-1914  and 1914-1931, than 
under  the Bretton  Woods or fluctuating rate regimes.  The two gold 
standard regimes differ by the presence or absence of a central bank. 
Establishment of the Federal Reserve System in 1914 initially reduced 
the measures of uncertainty, but the decline did not persist. A larger 
and longer sustained decline in  uncertainty occurred  in the postwar 
period. The data suggest that, for the United States, uncertainty about 
the long-term price level and level of output was higher under the gold 
standard than under Bretton Woods or fluctuating rates. 
The U.S.  inflation rate has been higher on average in the postwar 
years than under the gold standard. People know this; they do not 
expect prices to be stable. The greater uncertainty found under the 
two gold standard regimes implies that the change in prices and output 
is predicted more accurately than under earlier regimes, although the 
expected price change is larger. 
Figure 4.1, from the  1982 Report of  the Gold Commission,  shows 
the higher average rate of inflation and lower variability for the United 
United States Wholesale Price Index  1972=100 
Y  Excludes 1838-1843 when specie payments were suspended. 
21  United States imposes gold export embargo from September 1917 to June 1919. 
;I/  Broken line indicates years excluded in computing trend. 
Note: See Michael D. Bordo, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 63 (May 1981) 
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States in the postwar period to 1980. From 1800 to about 1950, prices 
rose and fell without any obvious change in the (ex post) long-term 
trend. Variability around the trend is greater, and yearly changes are 
more erratic, until the middle 1950s. 
Comparisons of  the Bretton Woods and fluctuating exchange rate 
regimes in  Meltzer (1984) shows no major difference in  uncertainty 
about prices and output for the  United  States following the shift to 
fluctuating exchange rates.  Meltzer (1988) finds that this conclusion 
does not hold generally. Germany and Japan reduced variability and 
uncertainty under the fluctuating exchange rate regime.  Uncertainty 
increased in  Britain.  Several other countries show mixed  results-a 
fall in the variability of unanticipated output and a rise in unanticipated 
price variability, or the reverse. Fluctuating exchange rates appear to 
permit countries to reduce variability and uncertainty, but countries 
may not adopt policies that achieve a gain in welfare. 
The comparison for the gold standard with other regimes in Meltzer 
(1984) uses a Kalman filter to compute forecasts from quarterly data 
for the  United States. Quarterly data may give excessive weight to 
short-term changes. Since the quarterly data for output and prices in 
earlier years were constructed  by  interpolation, they  may introduce 
bias and error of  interpretation.  Further, U.S.  experience under the 
gold standard may differ from the experience of other countries. Below, 
we reconsider the same issues using annual data for seven countries. 
Any comparison between the gold standard and other standards must 
rely on data for the nineteenth century. Most data for that century were 
pieced together after the fact, so the data may be less accurate than 
data for the postwar period. We  cannot check the extent to which the 
potential inaccuracy increases variability and forecasting errors in the 
indexes on which we rely. Below, we compare some series on prices 
for particular commodities to the indexes. 
4.2  Inflation and Growth in Seven Countries 
The data we analyze comes from seven countries that differ in size 
and in  their commitment to the gold standard. These countries, with 
dates for which we have data, are shown in table 4.2. Also shown are 
the dates for the classical period, when many of the countries were on 
the gold  standard. We  refer to this period as the classical period to 
distinguish it from the gold exchange standard that followed World War 
I  and the mixed standard before  1870. For comparison, we use data 
for the Bretton Woods system, 1950-72 for all countries, and for fluc- 
tuating exchange rates, 1973-85.  Dating the end of  Bretton Woods in 
1972 instead of 1971 is arbitrary. In previous work using quarterly data 
there is little difference for main conclusions whether fluctuating rates 171  Stability Under the Gold Standard in Practice 
Table 4.2  Dates Used in Data Analysis of the Gold Standard 
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"Italy was not on the gold standard during most of  the classical period. 1881 is the start 
of stabilization. The lira was on gold from 1884 to 1894, and was inconvertible from 
1894 to 1913. 
boutput data starts in  1878. Japan was on a bimetallic standard from 1879 to 1897. 
start in third quarter 1971 or first quarter 1973. Here, all dataare  annual. 
We  start the fluctuating rate regime in 1973. 
Growth rates of output and rates of inflation differed under the dif- 
ferent regimes. We  divided the classical period into two phases. The 
first, a period of deflation, ends in 1896; from 1897 to 1913 prices rose 
under the impact of new gold discoveries and new techniques for ex- 
tracting gold. 
Table 4.3 shows the experience of the seven countries in four periods. 
Real growth is highest in countries other than the United States under 
the Bretton Woods regime and, with the exception of Italy, lowest under 
fluctuating exchange rates. The fluctuating rate period includes the two 
oil shocks and the disinflation of the 1980s, so it is not clear that lower 
growth is a direct consequence of the fluctuating rate regime. 
Several countries show faster growth in the inflationary phase of the 
classical period than in the deflationary phase. There is, however, little 
evidence of  significant correlation across countries between the infla- 
tion rate  and the rate of growth within a regime. Nor  do we find a 
relation between inflation and growth in our data for individual countries. 
The faster real growth under the Bretton Woods regime cannot be 
explained entirely as a recovery from wartime destruction. The same 
result is found if  we start the regime in 1960. Several explanations of 
the growth have been proposed, including the built-in flexibility of  a 
larger government, increased trade under GATT rules, and the devel- 
opment of  the European Community, but little has been done to test 
these explanations. It is clear, however, from the comparative data that 
the welfare gain from rising living standards is highest in the years of 
the Bretton Woods regime. 
If  the welfare loss from inflation increases with the average rate of 
inflation (or deflation), the loss is greater in the postwar regimes than 172  Allan H. MeltzedSaranna Robinson 
Table 4.3  Growth and Inflation Under Different Regimes (percent per 
annuma) 
From Start of Classical 
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Computed as (log X,+k - logX,)/k. 
h1878-96  under a bimetallic standard 
cI  873-96. 
in  the classical period. The average rate of inflation is highest  under 
fluctuating  rates. This is misleading.  As is well  known, adoption of 
fluctuating exchange rates came as a consequence of rising inflation 
under Bretton Woods. Although average rates of inflation  are higher 
for four of the seven countries, all of the countries in our sample had 
reduced inflation by the 1980s. For most countries in our sample, in- 
flation was below the average rate under Bretton Woods by 1986. 
Short-term persistence of price movements was common under the 
gold standard, but short-term persistence is generally highest for the 
yearly rates of inflation under Bretton Woods. We use first-order serial 
correlation coefficients to measure persistence in actual price changes. 
Table 4.4 shows the correlations. Only Italy and Japan show any evi- 
dence of  short-term reversion. For several countries, the degree of 
short-term persistence is not  very  different under the gold  standard 
than under fluctuating rates. This is contrary to the inference of Klein 
(1976) who predicted increased serial correlation. Klein may have had 
a higher order correlation in mind. Our  calculations (not shown) suggest 
that first-order serial correlation is typically highest of  all. 
Many of the claims about predictability and uncertainty under the 
gold standard and other regimes cannot be resolved with data on actual 
rates of change. To  go beyond these comparisons, we require a pro- 173  Stability Under the Gold Standard in Practice 
Table 4.4  First-Order Serial Correlation of  Annual Price Changes 
Country  Gold Standard  Bretton Woods  Fluctuating Rates 
Denmark  0.38  0.42  0.60 
Germany  0.14*  0.39  0.34* 
Japan  -0.15*  0.09*  0.38* 
Sweden  0.31  0.52  0.34* 
U.K.  0.32  0.49  0.34* 
U.S.  0.21  0.60  0.18* 
*Indicates autocorrelation not significant as measured by  2 standard deviations. 
Italy  -0.33  -  0.09  -0.33 
cedure that separates anticipated from unanticipated values. The fol- 
lowing section describes the procedure we used. 
4.3  Computing the Shocks 
We chose the multistate Kalman filter (MSKF)6  because it has several 
advantages over conventional forecasting techniques. Specifically, the 
MSKF: (I) recognizes and separates permanent and transient errors in 
the level of the series as well as permanent changes in the slope; (2) is 
sensitive to changes in  level and scope and can alter its degree of 
sensitivity to compensate for changes in the series due to real changes 
in  the  economic system (such as a change  in  monetary  regime) or 
changes in  noise; and (3)  produces a forecast of  the series as well as 
a joint parameter distribution which allows us to obtain more infor- 
mation through a decomposition of the forecast errors into their sub- 
components (Harrison and Stevens 1971). 
To  implement the MSKF, we used the following model: 
(1)  x,  = B, + E,  E, -  q(O,uZ), 
(2) 
(3)  i,  = iz-1  + pr  pt -  q(O,u;), 
Bf = f,-l  + i,  + y,  y, -  q(O&),  and 
where x,is the actual (log) level of the series to be forecast, X is the 
permanent level of the series, and i  is the permanent growth rate. The 
variables E,, y,, and p, are, respectively, transitory shocks to the level 
of the series, permanent shocks to the level of the series (transitory 
shocks to the growth rate), and permanent shocks to the growth rate. 
These shocks are serially uncorrelated with zero means and variances 
shown in equations (I),  (2),  and (3). Combining equations (1) through 
(3) we  have 
(4)  x,  =x,-1  + X,-I  + F, +y, + p,. 174  Allan H. MeltzedSaranna Robinson 
In conventional forecasting systems, E, + yr + p, = el, the forecast 
error. This breakdown of the forecast error provided by the MSKF is 
one of the advantages mentioned at the start of this section. 
The basic model described in equations (1) through (3) is equivalent 
to Holt’s (1957) system: 
(5)  e,  = x, - (x,  + i,-l), 
(6)  E(.f,)  =  +  + Ale,, and 
(7)  E(&) =  + A2e,. 
Holt’s  smoothing constants A,  and A, are functions of the variance 
ratios u:/uz  and uz/u$ respectively. 
The basic model is also similar to the familiar ARIMA (0,2,2)7  model 
shown in equation (8). 
(8)  A2x, = (1 - Q1P - Q,P2)a,  a, -  q(O,d). 
The standard problem with the two more conventional forecasting 
systems is the choice of the parameters which determine system sen- 
sitivity (i.e., A,  and A2 in Holt and Ql and Q2 in Box-Jenkins). The 
problem arises because of the inherent tradeoffs. A highly sensitive 
system responds quickly to real changes when  they  occur, but also 
overreacts to transient changes. On the other hand, a relatively insen- 
sitive system does not react to noise, but is also slow to react to real 
changes. The MSKF overcomes this problem. 
In modeling economic time series, we can think of three basic states 
corresponding to the three errors, E,,  y,, and pl. In state  1  the series 
continues at some average level with occasional large transient changes 
in that level. This corresponds to large uz  and small (.: and uz.  In state 
2 the series stays at one level, experiences a permanent change in level, 
then continues fluctuating around the new level. In this case u:  dom- 
inates ~2  and uz.  In state 3 we have a permanent change in the growth 
rate, and CT~  dominates. Figure 4.2, from Harrison and Stevens (1971), 
shows the three types of  change. 
Unless we are in the trivial case with u;  = a:  = u;5  = 0, we can 
never know X, and if  with certainty. Our knowledge about X, and i,  is 
given by  a bivariate  normal distribution. Successive observations of 
the series,  x, modify this distribution. Let the  joint posterior distribution 
of (i,  i)  at time t - 1 be bivariate normal: 
(9)  (Xt-1, it-llxf-1) -  q (4,-I). 175  Stability Under the Gold Standard in Practice 
F--  Permanent change in level 
Permanent change in growth rate 
Fig. 4.2 
The posterior distribution at time t is also bivariate normal: 
(10)  (L  b,)  -  rl(+t), 
where  +,  = B(u,-  1;  u;, u;,  m;). 
The B-function revises the posterior probability distribution at time 
t  using  Bayesian  forecasts, the posterior  distribution +,- I, and the 
generating variances. The relative importance given to recent and past 
observations in revising the probability weights depends on the past 
history of shocks. When a high probability is assigned to being in state 
1  (transitory changes), observations  in  the distant  past  carry  more 
weight. Forecasts are less sensitive to new information; the expected 
value of xt+  I is not much affected by the error in  time t. The reason 
is that the error is expected to be mostly transitory. In the opposite 
case, when past history implies that permanent changes are relatively 
frequent, state 2 or state 3 is considered more likely, so more recent 
observations of x receive greater weights in determining forecasts. Each 
period, the weights on the various shocks-the  probabilities assigned 
to each shock-are  revised  to make use of  new information and to 
reflect the accuracy of the forecasting model in the recent past. 
The program also revises the estimate of the conditional variance of 
the forecast error each period. The assumptions on which this com- 
putation depends are discussed in Kool (1983). 
A possible disadvantage of the estimation procedure is that there is 
no allowance for mean reversion. As shown in equation (3),  growth 176  Allan H. MeltzedSaranna Robinson 
rates are pure random walks. However, if mean reversion is slow, errors 
from this source are largely offset by the revision of the weights each 
period. The random walk has the advantage of  permitting the values 
currently expected for prices or output in the distant future to be com- 
puted from information available today. The forecast for k periods in 
the future, made at the beginning of  time t, is 
+ kx,-  ,E(x,  + k)  = .f- 
Another disadvantage of the MSKF procedure is that forecasts are 
based on a single time series. Information in related series is ignored. 
In practice, we have used vector autoregressions (VARs) to relate fore- 
cast errors for prices and output to lagged values. In previous work 
(Meltzer 1985) the VARs have added only a relatively small amount of 
additional information. This suggests that the MSKF procedure is rel- 
atively efficient. 
In practice the MSKF combines six filter models to analyze the data. 
The six models decompose the data into two groups, with  E,, Y,, and 
pt errors in each group. The two groups separate normal errors and 
outliers, the latter consisting  of  5  percent  of  the errors.  Separating 
errors into normal and outlier values permits the program to give less 
weight to large, one-time changes. 
Since the MSKF model is equivalent to an ARIMA model with ad- 
justable coefficients, forecast errors are typically smaller for MSKF 
than for the ARIMA model. An additional advantage is that each fore- 
cast depends only on data for periods prior to the time the forecast is 
made. In practice, of course, the forecasting technique was not avail- 
able for most of the period.  We  treat the forecasts and errors as an 
approximation to the information available to a relatively accurate fore- 
caster at the time. 
To evaluate the forecast accuracy of the MSKF, forecasts using sev- 
eral ARIMA models and a random walk* were generated for German 
prices and real output. The time periods are 1875-1913,  1950-72,  and 
1973-85,  as in  previous  tables.  Forecast errors are measured using 
both  mean absolute percentage error (MAE) and root  mean  square 
error (RMSE). None of the alternative ARIMA models had MAE or 
RMSE values as low as the values for the random walk. Further, table 
4.5  shows that, with minor exceptions, the MSKF performs as well or 
better than the random walk model under all monetary regimes and for 
both variables. 
Comparison of the MSKF forecasts of prices and output to the means 
and standard deviations of actual price level and output series provides 
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Table 4.5  Comparison of Forecast Accuracy for Germany 
Real Output  Prices 
Model  GS  BW  FR  GS  BW  FR 
Errors measured using MAE 
MSKF  0.1  1  0.49  0.16  0.12  0.76  0.96 
Random walk  0.40  0.48  0.16  0.73  0.83  0.94 
Errors measured using RMSE 
MSKF  0.01  0.07  0.03  0.01  0.03  0.04 
Random walk  0.05  0.07  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.03 
Nofes: 
x -  F1 
x, 
MAE,  = --  x  100. 
RMSE,  = V(X,  -  F? 
GS = gold standard; BW  = Bretton Woods; FR  = fluctuating rates. 
F~ = forecast of& 
are shown in table 4.6. The distributions of the MSKF forecasts very 
closely approximate the distributions of the actual series being forecast. 
In virtually all cases the means and standard deviations of the forecast 
values are equal to or within a few one-hundredths of the actual values. 
Data for the period before World War I and after World War I1 are 
treated separately in our analysis. Wartime and interwar data are omit- 
ted. The reasons are that data are not available for all countries during 
wartime, and interwar data for German prices are affected by the hy- 
perinflation. This has a cost, however. The MSKF program uses some 
arbitrary values for the initial prior probabilities. Initial forecast values 
depend on these weights. In practice, this problem is reduced for sev- 
eral countries during the classical period by starting the analysis when 
the data series begin, but using only values for the classical period. 
Both sets of dates are shown in table 4.2 above. 
We  treat the annual data for 1950 to 1985 as one data set. An alter- 
native procedure would analyze the two postwar regimes separately. 
It would remove the influence of  the Bretton Woods period from the 
forecasts made during the early years of  the fluctuating rate period. 
The shift in regime would be analyzed as a break in forecast patterns 
instead of a gradual transition with uncertainty about whether countries 
would return to a fixed rate regime. The tradeoff is that forecasts would 
depend considerably more on the arbitrary conditions assumed at the 
start of  the new regime. This would have considerable impact in the 
fluctuating rate period  which has only thirteen annual observations. 
The analysis, as performed, carries the probability weights from the 
Bretton Woods period into the start of the fluctuating rate period. The 178  Allan H. Meltzer/Saranna Robinson 
Table 4.6  Descriptive Statistics: Actual Values and MSKF Forecasts 
Means  Standard Deviations 
GS  BW  FR  GS  BW  FR 
Red Output 
Denmark  7.41  9.41  10.01  0.24  0.3 I  0.06 
7.44  9.45  10.02  0.25  0.31  0.06 
Germany  9.82  13.43  14. I6  0.28  0.43  0.08 
9.82  13.50  14.  in  0.29  0.41  0.08 
Italy  4.29  11.91  12.66  0.18  0.38  0.08 
4.30  1 1.89  12.65  0.18  0.39  0.08 
Japan  8.67  11.02  12.33  0.17  0.63  0.16 
8.67  11.10  12.38  0.19  0.66  0.16 
Sweden  7.66  9.78  10.34  0.33  0.28  0.05 
7.68  9.82  10.36  0.33  0.28  0.05 
U.K.  8.07  9.01  9.45  0.23  0.20  0.05 
8.09  9.04  9.46  0.24  0.20  0.05 
U.S.  4.36  14.24  14.79  0.30  0.24  0.09 
4.40  14.27  14.81  0.30  0.24  0.09 
Prices 
Denmark  3.98  6.02  7.30  0.08  0.31  0.34 
3.97  6.06  7.39  0.08  0.33  0.33 
Germany  4.37  3.80  4.55  0.08  0.20  0.16 
4.37  3.83  4.60  0.08  0.21  0.14 
Italy  3.02  2.88  4.43  0.08  0.26  0.60 
3.02  2.87  4.42  0.09  0.27  0.60 
3.09  3.53  4.56  0.12  0.28  0.15 
Sweden  4.47  6. I4  7.29  0.08  0.22  0.37 
4.48  6. I8  7.38  0.10  0.27  0.37 
U.K.  3.96  5.84  7.26  0.06  0.25  0.47 
3.96  5.88  7.38  0.06  0.26  0.46 
3.26  3.67  4.58  0.12  0.18  0.27 
Notes:  For each country, first line is actual value, second line is MSKF forecast. GS = 
gold standard; BW = Bretton Woods; FR = fluctuating exchange rates. 
Japan  3.12  3.48  4.52  0.13  0.29  0. in 
U.S.  3.25  3.65  4.51  0.10  0.16  0.28 
weights are then  revised as new information arrives. The procedure 
we  adopted has greater intuitive appeal as a model of learning about 
the consequences  of  a change in  regime than  the  use of  arbitrarily 
chosen values for the underlying variances and prior probabilities.’ 
4.4  Forecast Errors in Different Regimes 
No monetary system can insulate output and the price level totally 
from  real  shocks to the economy.  Monetary regimes can  affect  the 
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unanticipated  disturbances.  A welfare-maximizing monetary rule would 
reduce variability to the minimum inherent in nature and institutional 
arrangements. Since we do  not know the welfare-maximizing monetary 
rule, we compare the relative performance under three monetary re- 
gimes:  the gold  standard, Bretton Woods,  and fluctuating exchange 
rates. 
Two measures of variability  are available: the mean absolute error 
(MAE) of one-period-ahead forecasts and the root mean square error 
(RMSE). Since there are occasional  large shocks or forecast errors, 
we rely on the MAE estimates for our comparisons to avoid excessive 
weight on large errors. This section compares the forecast errors for 
output and prices, computed using the MSKF program, for seven coun- 
tries under the three regimes. 
The estimates of  E, y, and p permit computation of three measures 
of variability. The first, a measure of the variability of the level of the 
variable, is the sum of d + 7 + p, where the bar indicates the MAE. 
This measure is more useful  for prices  than  for output, since price 
stability  increases welfare while stable output with rising population 
implies a decline in  per capita output. The second measure,  + p, 
omits the transitory error in the level of output;  7 shows the variability 
of  transitory changes in  the growth  rate of  output and p  shows the 
variability of permanent changes in the growth rate. Their sum gives 
the variability of the measured growth rate of output and the measured 
rate of price change. Third, we show 0,  the mean change in the per- 
manent growth rate of output and the maintained rate of inflation. pis 
a measure of uncertainty about sustained future growth and inflation. 
Table 4.7 shows the data for the levels and growth rates of output. 
Several features deserve comment. 
First, variability of output is usually higher under the gold standard 
then in the postwar regimes. The only exceptions are the United King- 
dom and Italy under fluctuating rates. 
Second, there is considerable similarity  in  the MAEs of  different 
countries under the gold standard. Denmark, Germany, and Italy have 
about equal values, as does the United States when a few large values 
are omitted. This suggests that common shocks may have dominated 
under the gold  standard. To test this proposition, we computed the 
correlation across countries for each output shock (E, y,  p) separately. 
The number of statistically significant positive correlations is consid- 
erably higher under fluctuating rates and Bretton Woods than under 
the gold standard, so the hypothesis is rejected.'O 
Third, the United  Kingdom and Japan have very different experi- 
ences under the three regimes. The United  Kingdom has the lowest 
variability  of  any country  under the gold  standard and  the second 
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Table 4.7  Mean Absolute Error Forecasts of Output and Growth 
(in percentages) 
Classical Period  Bretton Woods  Fluctuating Rates 











~~  ~ 
3.1  2.7  1.6  2.6  2.2  1.2  2.5  2.2  1.2 
3.0  2.2  0.6  2.6  2.3  1.3  2.2  2.0  1.3 
3.1  2.3  0.9  1.9  1.5  0.8  5.0  4.7  2.8 
3.0  2.8  1.7 
14.1  12.3  8.0  2.6  2.1  1.2  1.6  1.4  0.9 
11.4  10.1  6.6 
3.8  3.2  1.3  1.9  1.6  0.9  2.0  1.9  1.1 
2.1  1.5  0.6  1.9  1.5  0.8  2.6  2.3  1.3 
4.3  3.3  1.5  1.7  1.4  0.7  3.1  2.8  1.7 
3.2  2.4  1.1 
Note:  (1)  = output; (2) = growth; (3) = sustained growth rate. 
aOmits two largest errors, 1983 and 1984. 
hBased on Okhana's estimates of  national income. Classical period includes 1880-96 
under bimetallism and 1897-1913 on gold. 
dOmits three largest errors-1893,  1895, 190&in  classical period. 
four largest errors--1882,  1883, 1885, 1899-in  classical period. 
variability under the gold standard and benefited from the lowest under 
fluctuating rates. 
Fourth, the United States has the lowest variability under Bretton 
Woods, although  the differences  with  Sweden, Italy, or the  United 
Kingdom are not large. The relatively low variability for the United 
States under Bretton Woods and for the United Kingdom in the classical 
period suggests that countries at the center of the exchange rate system 
may  benefit  from  lower  output  variability. This  would occur if, on 
balance, other countries absorb output shocks received from the center. 
There is some evidence of this for the gold standard, but not for the 
Bretton Woods system. The correlations of shocks show seven (out of 
a possible twenty-one) negative values in the range -  0.4  to -  0.5 under 
the gold  standard. Five of  the  seven involve  the  United  Kingdom. 
Under Bretton Woods and fluctuating rates, all statistically significant 
correlations are positive. 
Fifth, the results for the United  States are qualitatively  similar to 
those based on quarterly data in Meltzer (1984). Variability of output 
and growth  is highest under the gold  standard. In part, the greater 
variability reflects relatively large errors in years of recession--1893 
and 190&but  the severity of recessions may reflect the operation of 
the gold standard. One difference from the quarterly data is that the 
variability of our measure of sustained growth, p, is slightly lower under 
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the one based on quarterly data and suggests slightly greater stability 
of the anticipated long-term path of  output relative to the fluctuating 
rate period. 
Sixth, uncertainty does not increase uniformly under fluctuating ex- 
change rates. Japan shows later variability on all measures, and vari- 
ability in Germany and Denmark either declines or remains the same. 
The principal increases in  uncertainty  are in  the United  States, the 
United Kingdom, and Italy. 
An alternative explanation of  the higher variability experienced in 
some countries under the gold standard is that sectoral shifts in  pro- 
duction have worked to make output less variable in recent years. The 
relative decline in agriculture and rise in manufacturing and services 
is often suggested as a principal reason for the change. This explanation 
fails to account  for the  experience of  the  United  Kingdom,  where 
variability is lower under the gold standard than under fluctuating rates, 
or of Germany, where the differences under the three standards are 
relatively small. Nevertheless, we tried to estimate the importance of 
change in output mix. To separate the effects of agriculture and man- 
ufacturing, we computed the variability of measures of industrial pro- 
duction under the gold standard for Germany and the United States. 
The MAEs for U.S. industrial production  1889-1913,  comparable to 
columns (1) to (3) of table 4.7, are, respectively, 8.50, 6.54, and 2.70. 
For  Germany, the computations are for 1875-1913,  the same period 
used  in  table 4.7. The German values are 2.80, 2.24, and  1.00. The 
calculations for Germany do not differ importantly from the calcula- 
tions for total output in table 4.7. For the United States all values are 
higher. Both calculations suffer from the fact that shocks to agriculture 
affect the demand for manufactures, the output of  manufacturing in- 
dustries, and the series on industrial production. Neither the data for 
Germany nor for the United States show evidence, however, that the 
use of total output or GDP biases our result against the gold standard. 
Finally, to pursue the issue of the relative variability of agricultural 
and industrial output, we computed the same measures of variability 
for a major crop in  the United  States and Germany under the gold 
standard. We  chose corn production  for the  United  States and  rye 
production for Germany. The numbers reported  are the same calcu- 
lations as columns (1) to (3) in table 4.7. The values for U.S. corn are 
15.42, 10.24, and 3.26, respectively, and for German rye, 9.44, 7.15, 
and 3.40. Under relative variability, the ratios of  U.S. corn to U.S. 
industrial production are 1.8, 1.6, and 1.2; the ratios of German rye to 
German industrial production are 3.4, 3.2, and 3.4. 
These data suggest that variability in the production of agricultural 
products was larger than the variability of industrial production under 
the  gold  standard.  For  Germany,  where  variability  of  industrial 182  Allan H. MeltzedSaranna Robinson 
production is lower than in the United States, relative variability for 
agricultural products is higher. Unlike the more ambiguous results for 
industrial  production,  the  data on relative  variability  provide  some 
evidence that the decline in the relative size of the agricultural sector 
may have contributed to the decline in variability over time. For Ger- 
many, the relative variability is large enough to reverse our previous 
conclusion. For the United  States, this is not  the case. Adjustment 
using the relative variability measure narrows the difference between 
the gold  standard and the Bretton Woods, but  does not change  the 
ranking. 
A problem with these results is that comparison of a single series on 
agricultural production to an index of  industrial production may bias 
the  result.  This would  occur if  total  agricultural  production  is  less 
variable than any single crop. We  have not pursued  this issue or ex- 
tended the calculation of relative variability to other periods. 
While no single regime has the lowest variability of output growth 
in all countries, fluctuating exchange rates have the highest variability 
of  output  growth  only  in  the  United  Kingdom and  Italy.  The data 
suggest that countries that follow medium-term predictable policies, 
like Japan, have been able to lower variability and uncertainty under 
fluctuating rates, while countries that follow less predictable policies- 
notably the U.S., the U.K., and Italy-have  not. In the latter countries, 
policy actions shift more frequently from stimulus to restraint, increas- 
ing variability and uncertainty. 
The U.K., the U.S.,  and Italy shifted in the late 1970s or early 1980s 
from  inflationary to  disinflationary policies.  The policy  change was 
sharp and sudden, and the U.S., U.K., and Italy suffered a relatively 
severe recession followed by  a relatively brisk recovery.  In contrast, 
Japan experienced a comparable (or higher) rate of inflation in  1974 
and 1975 as it, like Germany, maintained more gradual and persistent 
policies. 
Italy, like Denmark, has a fixed but adjustable exchange rate with 
respect to countries in the European Monetary System and fluctuating 
rates against the pound, the dollar, and the yen. Variability of  output 
and growth in  Italy under fluctuating rates differs considerably from 
the experience of Denmark, however. 
The contrasting experiences under the fluctuating rate regime suggest 
that differences in policy action and in the perceived degree of  com- 
mitment to a stable policy are an important source of the difference in 
outcome. Fluctuating exchange rates do not enhance or prevent vari- 
ability. They provide an opportunity to increase stability. Some coun- 
tries have benefited from the opportunity, but others have not. 
The results for prices and inflation show a similar, mixed pattern. 
Again, no regime dominates in all  countries.  Data for variability of 
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Table 4.8  Mean Absolute Error for Prices and Inflation (in percentages) 
~~  ~~  ~  ~ 
Classical Period  Bretton Woods  Fluctuating Rates 










1.9  1.8  1.2  2.4  1.9  1.2  1.8  1.7  1.1 
3.2  3.0  1.9  2.0  1.7  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.6 
2.8  2.5  1.2  1.9  1.5  0.9  2.9  2.7  2.1 
2.5  2.3  1.8 
3.9  3.3  1.6  2.2  1.7  0.9  2.7  2.4  1.3 
1.9  1.5  0.8  1.9  1.8  1.1 
3.0  2.9  2.2  2.7  2.2  1.1  1.8  1.7  1.0 
1.8  1.6  1.0  2.0  1.6  0.9  4.6  4.3  2.1 
2.2  1.8  0.9  2.3  2.3  1.2  1.9  1.8  1.0 
Nofe:  (I) = price level; (2) = rate of price change; (3) = maintained inflation. 
"Omits 1974. 
bIncludes 1879-97  under bimetallism, with  1898- 1913 on the gold standard. 
'Omits  one large outlier:  1965 under Bretton Woods, and 1975 under fluctuating rates. 
One of the claimed advantages of the gold standard is the reduced 
variability  of long-run anticipated inflation. The annual data, like the 
quarterly data for the United States in Meltzer (1984), give little support 
to this claim. For most countries the variability of maintained inflation 
(table 4.8, column 3) is as high or higher under the gold standard than 
under Bretton Woods or the fluctuating rate regime. There is no evi- 
dence that the gold standard fostered long-term price stability as that 
term is used here." 
Generally,  prices  and rates of price  change  have smaller forecast 
errors in one of the postwar regimes. The United  Kingdom is, again, 
the exception since price level forecast errors are lowest there under 
the gold  standard. For the United  States, forecast errors are lowest 
under fluctuating rates, not under the Bretton Woods system. 
The three regimes differ in the sources of price variability. The av- 
erage MAE for the seven countries in the classical period  is higher 
(2.7) than under Bretton Woods (2.3) or fluctuating rates (2.4). Each 
type of error, E, y,  and p, is largest on average in the classical period. 
Transitory errors in  level  are smallest under fluctuating  rates; fluc- 
tuating rates appear to buffer transitory shocks. Permanent shocks to 
growth are relatively more important under fluctuating rates than under 
Bretton Woods, reflecting the experience of Italy and the United King- 
dom. That experience suggests,  however,  that under the fluctuating 
rate system countries were less successful in buffering shocks to the 
perceived permanent rate of inflation than transitory shocks to the price 
level. Wage indexation following the oil shocks most likely contributed 
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William  Poole has suggested to us that we provide  estimates for 
individual commodity prices to see whether our estimates of anticipated 
long-term variability under the gold standard are biased or misleading. 
Table 4.9 reports the results for metals, chemicals, and wool  prices 
under the three regimes.  In all three cases, the lowest variability  is 
under the Bretton Woods regime. For metals prices, variability is high- 
est under the gold standard, but for chemicals and wool, variability is 
highest under fluctuating rates. The relatively high variability of chem- 
ical prices in  recent years reflects, to some degree, the effects of pe- 
troleum prices on petrochemical prices, but this does not explain the 
relatively  high variability of wool prices. Of particular interest is the 
variability of sustained inflation. Although the results in table 4.9 draw 
on only a small part of the available data, they give no reason to believe 
that the computations based on price index numbers (table 4.8) give a 
misleading or biased view of the variability of unanticipated  changes 
in prices and sustained inflation under the gold standard. 
Recent work in monetary economics investigates the types of shocks 
that dominate fluctuations in output. Much of this work relies on quar- 
terly changes in the United States in recent years, a period that includes 
major changes in oil prices. The shocks to output and prices estimated 
here provide some relevant information for other countries over a longer 
time and under different regimes. 
Table 4.10 shows the contemporaneous correlation between  unan- 
ticipated  changes in  output and prices under the three monetary re- 
gimes.  A  positive correlation between  shocks suggests the possible 
dominance of shocks to aggregate demand. The reason is that unan- 
ticipated changes in aggregate demand shift the aggregate demand curve 
along an unchanged, positively sloped, short-run supply curve, so out- 
put and prices rise and fall together. Unanticipated shifts in aggregate 
supply along a negatively sloped aggregate demand curve induce a rise 
in prices and a decline in output, or a fall in prices and a rise in output. 
The correlations are subject  to different  interpretations. Taken  as 
evidence of the type of shock, however, they show that neither demand 
Table 4.9  Mean Absolute Error for U.S. Commodity Prices in Three Regimes 
(in percentages) 
Classical Period  Bretton Woods  Fluctuating  Rates 
Commodity  (I)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Metals  9.38  7.74  3.73  2.24  1.81  0.98  5.25  1.73  3.16 
Chemicals  3.11  2.66  1.65  1.26  1.09  0.55  10.57  8.46  5.50 
Wool  15.63  14.44  8.53  13.71  10.30  3.78  21.78  11.84  6.38 
Note: (I) = price level; (2) = rate of price change; (3) = maintained  rate of price change. 185  Stability Under the Gold Standard in Practice 
Table 4.10  Correlations: Price Level and Output Forecast Errors 
Country  Classical Period  Bretton Woods  Floating Rates 
Denmark  0.28 
Germany  0.02 
Italy  -0.00 
Japan  -0.13 
Sweden  0.12 
U.K.  -0.01 
U.S.  0.20 
-  0.88 
-0.34 












or supply  shocks dominate the contemporaneous correlations in all 
countries or under all  regimes. The classical period  shows no fixed 
pattern. The correlations are relatively  small in all countries and are 
consistent with a mixture of supply and demand shocks. Such a pattern 
would arise from a mixture of productivity shocks in various countries 
and gold  movements in response to changes in relative productivity 
and relative demand. Under Bretton Woods, the correlations are neg- 
ative except in the United States, where the pattern is similar to that 
found for the classical period.  The pattern under fluctuating  rates is 
similar to that under Bretton Woods, with differences for individual 
countries, but the same mix of relatively high negative correlations in 
three or four countries and less clear-cut results in the remainder. 
If  we accept the evidence from the correlations, searching for the 
dominant type of shock is not likely to prove fruitful. This is not sur- 
prising. There is little reason to believe that shocks to aggregate demand 
or to aggregate supply dominate fluctuations of output and prices. Eco- 
nomic theory gives no reason for presuming that one or another type 
of shock dominates under all regimes. 
A system of fluctuating rates permits countries to reduce shocks to 
aggregate demand from abroad. If under Betton Woods there were a 
mix of aggregate demand shocks from abroad and domestic or inter- 
national shocks to supply, the shift to fluctuating rates would heighten 
the relative importance of supply shocks by eliminating (or reducing) 
the influence of aggregate demand shocks. The relatively  strong oil 
shocks and the change in  regime  could  then  produce the observed 
change in the correlations  for countries like Japan and the United States 
following the change in regime. 
4.5  interaction Between Shocks 
Prices and output are part of an interactive system in which shocks 
to one variable  affect forecasts for that  variable  and  others in  the 
economic system. Also, shocks to one variable induce shocks to other 186  Allan H. Meltzer/Saranna Robinson 
variables or to the same variable at a later date. The MSKF estimates 
ignore these interactions. In this section we discuss some efforts to go 
beyond the univariate system to explore interaction across countries 
and between shocks within a country. 
To study the interactions, we use VARs to relate the shocks estimated 
using the MSKF. The VARs form a system of  linear regressions of 
equal lag length relating, for example, the current price shock (or output 
shock) to lagged values of price and output shocks in the same country 
or in a foreign country.12 
The VARs relating shocks to output and prices in the same country 
yield results not unlike the contemporaneous correlations. There is no 
dominant pattern. Some interactions between price and output shocks 
are negative, some are positive, but  most are not  significant by  the 
usual standards. 
We  investigated the effect of introducing the interrelation between 
prices  and output in  the home country and  in the country with  the 
dominant currency-the  U.K. in the classical period and the U.S. under 
the Bretton Woods system. Again, no consistent patterns were found, 
perhaps because the number of degrees of freedom becomes relatively 
small, particularly in  the postwar regimes. To  investigate this possi- 
bility, we computed the matrix of simple correlations between  price 
shocks across countries for each type of  shock and, separately, the 
simple correlation between output shocks. There are seven countries, 
so there are twenty-one correlation coefficients for each type of shock. 
The number of degrees of freedom differ in the different regimes, with 
the largest number for the gold standard and the smallest number for 
fluctuating rates. 
Table 4.11 shows the number of correlations that are at least twice 
the computed standard error of the transformed correlation, 
1 
uz  =  ~ m’ 
where n is the number of observations and 
I+r 
z  = Y21n- 
I-r 
for correlation r. For prices, the number of correlations shown is largest 
under Bretton Woods and smallest under the gold standard. For output, 
the number of correlations in the table is highest under fluctuating rates. 
The latter may reflect the common oil shocks in the 1970s. Whatever 
the reason, it is clear that fluctuating rates did not prevent unanticipated 
shocks from affecting prices and output in several countries. Moreover, 
the effects on prices and output are found for permanent and transitory 
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Table 4.11  Correlations by Type of Shock and by  Regime 
Gold Standard  Bretton Woods  Fluctuating Rates 
&  Y  P  &  Y  P  &  Y  P 
Output 
Positive  1  2  1  6  6  6  7  9  9 
Negative  3  2  2  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Prices 
Positive  2  3  3  10  8  11  7  9  7 
Negative  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
A notable difference between the gold standard and other standards 
is the finding of  correlated negative shocks to output and prices. For 
the gold standard this is consistent with, and supportive of, the con- 
clusion reached by Easton (1984) using deviations from trend of output. 
One plausible explanation is that under the gold standard, gold flows 
worked to expand output in one country and contract it in another, as 
the price-specie mechanism implies. This mechanism may have been 
strong enough to overcome the effects of common shocks arising from 
gold discoveries, technical changes in gold production, and changes in 
the demand for gold. Closer examination shows that both of the neg- 
ative  correlations for permanent  output  shocks  involve  the  United 
Kingdom.I3 As noted earlier, this suggests that the United Kingdom 
may have succeeded in lowering output variability under the gold stan- 
dard by  allowing the London market to serve as an international  fi- 
nancial market. 
There are no  similar findings for the United  States under Bretton 
Woods. In fact, there are no correlations involving U.S. output in table 
4.11 for the Bretton Woods period. For the price level and inflation cor- 
relations the situation is very different: five of the eleven correlations 
for p include the United States. Only Italy shows a relatively small cor- 
relation with the United States. It appears that the MSKF finds the ex- 
pected interrelation between shocks to the maintained U.S. inflation rate 
and shocks to maintained inflation in other countries under fixed ex- 
change rates. In contrast, only two of the eight correlations between 
permanent shocks to the price level under Bretton Woods involve the 
United States. It appears that one-time price level changes, estimated 
by y,  did not diffuse internationally to the same degree as did persistent 
inflation under Bretton Woods, estimated by p. 
Many of the papers in Bordo and Schwartz (1984) report mainly null 
results for interactions under the gold standard, similar to the results 
we obtained from VARs using annual observations. These findings are 
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exchange rates has been reported for centuries. The problem may be 
the quality of the data, as some authors suggested, or the use of annual 
rather than quarterly data, or the relatively  small number of degrees 
of  freedom available. 
To investigate the effect of  using quarterly data, thereby increasing 
the number of degrees of freedom, we used  available quarterly data 
for the United States and the United Kingdom under the gold standard. 
Gordon (1982) developed quarterly values of  output and prices for the 
U.S.; Friedman and Schwartz (1963) provide  quarterly data for the 
U.S. monetary base; and Capie and Webber (1985) constructed quar- 
terly data for the U.K. monetary base. To  study interaction under the 
gold  standard, we  estimated VARs  relating  shocks to the monetary 
base in the U.S. (BUS), the monetary base in the U.K. (BUK), U.S. 
real GNP and price deflator (RUS and PUS), for the period mid-1891 
to mid-1914. Shocks were computed using the MSKF program sepa- 
rately on each of the series. The results of the VARs are shown in table 
4.12 for four lags. 
The quarterly data suggest statistically  significant interactions be- 
tween shocks to nominal and real values in the United States and the 
Table 4.12  Vector Autoregressions for the U.S. and U.K.  (4 lags, 
18912 to 19142) 
Dependent  Sum of 





BUS  -  1.77 
RUS  0.02 
PUS  0.51 
BUK  -  0.23 
BUS  0.67 
PUS  0.77 
BUK  -  0.05 
BUS  -0.41 
RUS  0.11 
PUS  -0.53 
BUK  0.33 
BUS  0.66 
RUS  0.00 
PUS  -0.46 
BUK  -  0.43 
RUS  -  0.60 












0.35  0.25  2.0 
0.2  I 
0.01 
0.05 
Norr: BUS = total shock to U.S. monetary base: RUS = total shock to U.S. real GNP; 
PUS = total shock to deflator: BUK :  total shock to U.K. monetary base. Quarterly 
U.S. data from RUS and PUS are from Gordon (1982): U.S. base from Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963); U.K.  base from Capie and Webber (1985). DW =  Durbin-Watson 
statistic. 
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United  Kingdom.  A main channel of interaction  relates  current and 
lagged values of shocks to the monetary bases in the United States and 
the United Kingdom with current and lagged values of shocks to prices 
and output. 
Lagged shocks to the U.S. price level have a positive effect on the 
(unanticipated)  U.S. base and a negative effect on the U.K. base of 
approximately the same magnitude after four quarters. An unantici- 
pated increase in U.S. prices induces a transfer of base money (gold) 
from the  U.K. to the U.S.; an unanticipated  decline in  U.S. prices 
induces an (unanticipated)  outflow of gold.  The lagged  effect of the 
lower U.K. base reinforces the effect of higher prices on the U.S.  base. 
Past unanticipated prices have a positive effect on U.S. output; price 
and output shocks are positively  related in the output equation, a pat- 
tern suggestive of demand shocks. Allowing for the lagged effects sug- 
gests a much  stronger and more reliable  relation  between shocks to 
prices and output than is shown by the contemporaneous correlations. 
A 1 percent (unanticipated) increase in the price level raises output by 
0.77 percent within four quarters. 
The relatively  strong and  significant interaction  between unantici- 
pated  prices  and money poses two problems. First, the response of 
unanticipated money to  unanticipated prices is opposite to the textbook 
description  of the gold  standard, where higher  U.S.  prices induce a 
flow of gold (base money) from the United States to the United King- 
dom or other countries. We  investigated whether the four-quarter re- 
sponse reversed at longer lags. For values up to twelve lags, the effect 
of  PUS on BUK changes to a positive  (and statistically  significant) 
sum, but the numerical value is small. Second, the estimates suggest 
that a change in unanticipated  prices moves the system away from a 
purchasing power parity equilibrium, at least for a time. 
Further, th.:  large (- 1.77) and  statistically  significant influence of 
lagged BUS on current BUS, and the smaller effect (-0.43) of lagged 
BUK on BUK suggests that stabilizing interaction under the gold stan- 
dard may have depended much more on internal dynamics and capital 
movements and interest rates than on the price and output changes 
emphasized by price-specie-flow theories. The estimated responses of 
BUS and BUK to RUS are small and  nonsignificant (0.02 and 0.00, 
respectively) and, as  noted, the responses to PUS reinforce rather than 
stabilize BUS and BUK for periods up to three years. 
On the financial side, we find that an unanticipated  shift in gold or 
capital from the U.K. to the U.S. raises BUS and lowers BUK. Pre- 
sumably, interest  rates rise in the U.K. and fall in the U.S., but the 
lagged effects of BUS work to reverse the unanticipated  increase in 
the U.S. monetary base and to offset the lagged effects of BUK on 
BUS. The lagged effects of BUK on current BUK reinforce the sta- 
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The stabilizing  effects  of  lagged  own values  of  the unanticipated 
impulses may have been reinforced by the effects of price, output, and 
money anticipations. We have not investigated these channels. Further, 
our results come from a study of incomplete bilateral adjustment. We 
do not have quarterly data on prices and output in the United Kingdom, 
and we neglect changes in third countries that were part of the trade 
and payments system. For these reasons, our findings are, at most, 
suggestive of the way the gold standard may have worked in practice. 
4.6  Conclusion 
As Schwartz (1984, 11) notes, there are several hypotheses but little 
empirical evidence about the transmission  of changes under the gold 
standard. Our study of unanticipated money, prices, and output begins 
to fill part of the gap and suggests that, at least for the United States 
and the United Kingdom, base movements played a dominant role in 
the international transmission of impulses. Price shocks as measured 
here had no role in achieving stability; the lagged effects of unantici- 
pated price impulses appear to have reinforced expansive or  contractive 
influences on output and money. 
There are many explanations of the difference between the operation 
of the gold standard in the classical period before World War I and its 
operation during  the interwar period.  Our findings  suggest  that in- 
creased management of capital flows under the gold exchange standard 
may explain part of the difference. The data for the United States and 
United Kingdom suggest that capital movements, operating as unan- 
ticipated changes in the monetary base, were a main force stabilizing 
the system following price changes. Price and output impulses either 
had weak short-term stabilizing properties or worked to reinforce prior 
impulses. Price movements helped to stabilize the U.S.-U.K.  system 
only, if  at all, after a period of years. To the extent that central bank 
management reduced interwar capital movements, it reduced the sta- 
bilizing effects of lagged  unanticipated  values of the U.S.  and U.K. 
monetary bases, thereby giving greater weights to the effects of past 
(unanticipated) price impulses.  I4 
A main aim of this study has been to compare the welfare properties 
of alternative monetary arrangements. The three monetary regimes we 
considered were the classical regime, when leading countries were on 
the international  gold  standard; the Bretton Woods regime; and the 
current fluctuating exchange rate regime.  We  used four criteria: rate 
of output growth, rate of inflation, and the stability  of prices and of 
output growth. To compute variability of prices, output, inflation, and 
real  growth, we relied  on estimates from a multistate  Kalman filter. 
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of  prices  and output for each  year,  and allocates the unanticipated 
changes to three types of shock: permanent changes in the growth rate, 
permanent changes in level, and transitory changes in level. 
We  analyzed data for seven countries that  differed in  size, in  the 
relative importance of  trade, and in institutions. The countries were 
Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. Some countries established a link to gold very early 
in the nineteenth century. Some, like Italy, remained on the gold stan- 
dard for only a brief period. We started the classical period about 1870, 
when several countries committed to maintain a fixed gold value of 
their currency. The classical period ends with the start of World War 
I, when most of the countries in our sample left the gold standard. 
No single system dominated on all the welfare criteria. We  do not 
attempt to weight the criteria to arrive at an overall judgment. Instead, 
we consider each criterion in turn. 
The rate of inflation was lowest, on average, under the gold standard. 
The rate of  growth was highest in most countries under the Bretton 
Woods system. The variability of  prices  and of  output growth was 
highest for most countries under the gold standard. The main exception 
was the U.K. 
There are well-known problems  in  making intertemporal compari- 
sons, so the evidence of increased variability under the gold standard 
should be treated cautiously. One explanation, unrelated to the mon- 
etary standard, was the greater variability of agriculture and its greater 
relative importance in earlier periods. Some attempts to calculate the 
relative variability of industrial and agricultural production gave limited 
support to this proposition. For prices, the limited evidence for the 
United States did not support the hypothesis, but the limited evidence 
from individual commodity prices was difficult to interpret. 
Some countries experienced greater stability under Bretton Woods, 
some under fluctuating exchange rates.  We  have found no evidence 
that the move to fluctuating exchange rates generally increased vari- 
ability of output, prices, growth, or inflation. On the contrary, some 
countries achieved greater stability under fluctuating rates than under 
the alternative regimes. We  conjecture that this result reflects the op- 
eration of credible, medium-term policies working either directly, or 
by stabilizing expectations, on the demand for money or velocity. 
Using quarterly data for the United States from 1890 to 1980, Meltzer 
(1984) found that short- and long-term variability of prices and output 
was higher under the gold standard than in  the postwar  years.  The 
annual data for the seven countries broadly support the same conclu- 
sion. In Meltzer, evidence of the much discussed long-term stability of 
prices under the gold standard comes mainly from ex post data showing 
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century or a century earlier. In contrast, our conclusion is based on a 
measure of long-term price anticipations. The latter seems to us a more 
relevant measure of  stability or uncertainty. 
A byproduct of our work was some evidence on the type of  shocks 
affecting the economies of the seven countries. We  have found that 
experience differed under different regimes and between countries. No 
dominant pattern emerged. The search for a uniform cause of fluctua- 
tions would appear to be a misplaced effort. 
Our results were subject to several limitations. The statistical model 
we use to compute impulses or shocks does not allow for mean re- 
version, an important part of the case for the gold standard. The gold 
standard provided a rule under which many felt confident that govern- 
ment policies would remain limited in scope. When governments adopted 
policies leading to temporary departures from gold or to devaluation, 
gold often provided an available means of  protection for individuals. 
Although our statistical procedure is adaptive, it does not fully reflect 
these welfare-enhancing attributes of  the classical gold standard. 
There are other limitations. The forecasts and measures of  shocks 
were based on data for periods prior to the period of the forecast, but 
the data on which we rely were not available at the time. And, as is 
well known, data for the nineteenth century are not entirely reliable. 
Further, we have not attempted to hold constant other relevant factors 
affecting output and prices, including weather, changes in output mix, 
and changes in nonmonetary policies. 
Despite these and other limitations, there is sufficient uniformity in 
our results to support two propositions. First, short- or long-term an- 
ticipations  about  prices  and output  were  less  stable under the gold 
standard than under the monetary arrangements of the past thirty-five 
years.  Second, a fluctuating exchange rate  regime does not  impose 
greater uncertainty and instability. Some countries were able to reduce 
uncertainty  about prices  and output  under the fluctuating exchange 
rate regime, both absolutely and relative to Bretton Woods and to the 
classical gold standard. 
Appendix 
Data Sources 
EUROPEAN  COUNTRIES:  Data on prices and output before World War 
I are from Mitchell (1976). Postwar data are from OECD, various is- 
sues. German industrial and rye production from 1875 to 1913 is from 
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JAPAN: Data for output from 1878 to 1913 are Okhana’s estimates of 
real income. Price data are for 1873-1913.  Both series are from Bank 
of Japan (1966). Postwar data are from OECD, various issues. 
UNITED  STATES:  Data for output and prices before World War I are 
Net National Product (Kendrick) and implicit GNP deflator (Kendrick) 
from U.S. Department of  Commerce (1966). Industrial production is 
Frickey’s index, 1889-1913, the U.S.  Department of Commerce series 
(1960,  13),  and the Federal  Reserve  index of  industrial  production, 
1950-85.  Metals prices and chemical prices are from Warren and Pear- 
son to 1890 and the Bureau of Labor Statistics after 1890; see Com- 
merce  (1960), series E7, E9, E20, and  E22 extended to  1985  using 
Bureau of Labor Statistics data. Corn production from 1889 to 1913 is 
from Commerce (1960), series K266. 
Notes 
1.  There were  suspensions of  the gold  standard and, in  some countries, 
devaluations  against gold even in the classical gold standard period.  See Ei- 
chengreen (1985,6) for a list of countries that devalued. Mussa (1986) compares 
variability of ex post real exchange rates under fixed and fluctuating exchange 
rates in the postwar era. 
2. Expansion  of trade under fixed exchange rates achieved  by  increasing 
variability of prices and output is not a clear welfare gain. Further, evidence 
on the relation between exchange rate regimes and the volume of trade is, at 
best, mixed. 
3. The periods are given in table 4.2 below. All end in 1913. 
4. For expositional purposes, we take the optimal rate of  inflation to be zero. 
5. Schwartz (1981) finds a negatively sloped gold supply curve for the postwar 
period, so the mechanism has not worked the same way in all periods. 
6. A  more complete discussion  is in  Bomhoff  (1983, chapter 4) and  Kool 
(1983). 
7. Testing the data for each country using standard Box-Jenkins identification 
techniques indicates that second differencing is required to achieve stationarity 
in almost all cases. 
8. We  use last period’s actual value as this period’s forecast. 
9. The computations  of  E, y and  p begin in  1952, so there are twenty-one 
years of fixed rates and thirteen years of fluctuating rates. 
10. The correlations are discussed more fully below. 
11. The random walk in the anticipated  growth  rate does not  incorporate 
mean reversion, as noted earlier. 
12. While the VARs help to compensate for our neglect of  interactions be- 
tween variables, they introduce a different problem. The estimates are no  longer 
“true” forecasts. Estimates for a particular period now depend on events that 
occur later in the sample period. 
13. The two countries are Denmark and Italy. The negatively correlated price 
shocks are for the United  Kingdom and Germany. 194  Allan H. Meltzerharanna Robinson 
14. Rich (1984) found that price movements worked to stabilize the U.S.- 
Canada bilateral system only over relatively long periods. 
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Comment  William Poole 
I enjoyed  reading the Meltzer-Robinson  (hereafter, MR) paper,' and 
learned a lot from it. There are two aspects to this work. First, MR 
provide  a compact  summary of  inflation and output data for seven 
countries  and a commentary on the principal  issues.  Second, they 
provide a detailed analysis of  their data using the multistate  Kalman 
filter. 
My  concerns about the Kalman filter in the context of  this paper 
involve the small number of observations and the quality of  the data. 
It appears that MR  estimate a substantial number of parameters from 
relatively few  observations.  The maximum number of  observations 
during the classical period is 44 for the United Kingdom; the Bretton 
Woods and floating rate periods taken together contain 36 observations. 
The results must depend heavily on the a priori specification. For the 
Bretton Woods and floating rate periods, the Kalman filter forecasts 
and forecast  errors are calculated  from 23 and  13 observations,  re- 
spectively. Given that the floating rate period has only 13 observations, 
I would be a little more cautious in drawing general conclusions about 
floating rates than are MR. As for the quality of the data, MR do  develop 
a strong case by examining a number of different countries and several 
different series for some countries. 
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 provide the basic findings of  the paper. Although 
the results are not  uniform across countries  and across periods,  in 
William Poole is a professor of economics and the director of the Center for the Study 
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general the classical period had somewhat higher variability of output 
forecast errors from the  Kalman filter than  the  Bretton Woods and 
flexible exchange rate periods. I read table 4.8 as essentially a draw in 
comparing price forecast errors during the classical period and the post- 
World War I1 periods. These tables do not provide support for arguing 
the superiority of the gold standard. 
Table 4.6  shows that  the  Kalman filter forecasts have means and 
standard deviations that are close to those of the actual data, indicating 
that the Kalman filter forecasts and the actual data have similar statis- 
tical properties. I would have expected the standard deviations of the 
Kalman filter forecasts to be significantly lower than those of the actual 
data, on the grounds that efficient forecasts cannot pick up the random 
component  in  the  levels of  the data.  The results  in  table  4.6 arise 
because the levels data are nonstationary, or approximately so; levels 
disturbances account for a small part of  the  standard  deviations of 
these  series.  Note  7 reports that  second differencing is  required  to 
achieve stationarity, and table 4.5  shows that for Germany the Kalman 
filter and random walk models are essentially  the same for both the 
Bretton Woods and flexible rate periods. My guess is that repeating 
table 4.5 for the other countries would yield similar results. 
In table 4.5 the Kalman filter forecasts are more accurate than ran- 
dom walk model forecasts only for the classical period. The reason, 
no doubt, is that the classical period has two distinctive  subperiods 
divided  by  1896, as table  4.1  shows.  The  Kalman  filter adjusts  its 
forecasts when going from one subperiod to the next, which the random 
walk model cannot do. 
MR focus attention on errors from Kalman filter forecasts, and they 
argue that the errors are likely to be related to welfare costs, However, 
they note that stability of output levels does not enhance welfare. Table 
4.7 should be read in  conjunction with table 4.3.  For most countries, 
growth was high and more stable during the Bretton Woods period than 
during either the classical or floating rate periods. 
In many applications the purpose of using a filter is to obtain efficient 
forecasts. Efficient forecasts may be relatively little affected by errors 
in the data; one of the purposes of any filtering technique is to deal 
effectively with data errors. But in the MR application, the name of 
the game is to estimate the forecast errors themselves. Data errors are 
included in these estimates, and surely the nineteenth-century data have 
larger errors than the post-World  War I1 data. Also, price indexes after 
World  War  I1 include many more goods which tends to make these 
series less  variable than  nineteenth-century  series constructed  from 
relatively few goods. 
The fact that the mean absolute errors in tables 4.7 and 4.8 are of 
the same order of  magnitude for the gold standard and floating rate 1W  Stability Under the Gold Standard in Practice 
periods  suggests that the “true”  errors-that  is, the forecast errors’ 
net of data errors-may  well have been smaller during the gold standard 
era. However, table 4.9 does not support this hypothesis for several 
U.S.  commodity price series, which are presumably of reasonably con- 
sistent quality over time. 
Data construction may also have something to do with the results in 
table 4.10 which reports correlations between price and output forecast 
errors. There is a striking difference between the correlations for the 
classical era and the post-World  War I1 era. I think it is correct that 
data on GNP or GDP after World War I1 start with nominal magnitudes, 
which are than split into real and price parts. Thus, errors in the price 
data create equal and opposite errors in the quantity data and could 
explain, in part, the negative correlations in table 4.10 for the Bretton 
Woods and floating rate periods. Moreover, when the implicit deflator 
is used as the price variable, cyclical changes in the composition of 
constant dollar GNP tend to create a negative correlation between the 
deflator and constant dollar GNP. Were the data for the classical era 
constructed in about the same way, or might a difference in construction 
explain the arithmetically larger correlations for the classical period? 
Negative serial correlation of price changes has been an important 
part of the case for the gold standard, but table 4.4 does not support 
the case. Before I accept the fine detail of these results, I need to know 
more about the data. We  know that constructing annual data by  av- 
eraging monthly data induces a spurious positive serial correlation of 
changes. There is also the  issue of  the extent to which nineteenth- 
century data were constructed using interpolations. Nevertheless, data 
construction  is  surely not  responsible for the fact that  the classical 
period consisted essentially of  a long deflation followed by a long in- 
flation. The case for negative serial dependence cannot be built on such 
evidence for there are only two observations: one deflation, followed 
by one inflation. 
Let me now turn to table 4.12 and the discussion surrounding it. The 
interactions across countries is an interesting and important topic, but 
I  am  uneasy  with  the  story  MR  try  to extract  from  vector  auto- 
regressions. Note that MR apply the VARs to the shocks estimated 
from the Kalman filter. It is certainly possible that the Kalman filter 
forecasts, which represent the systematic part of the individual series, 
display relationships across countries that exactly fit the classic gold 
standard mechanisms. 
The VARs may be telling us that the forecast errors computed from 
the Kalman filter are higher than  they should be. MR note  that the 
Kalman filter ignores interactions across variables. If table 4.12 is read 
as suggesting that there are indeed some interactions of modest statis- 
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earlier in the paper may not be a reliable guide to comparing variability 
across countries and exchange rate regimes.  However, because the 
VARs do not identify highly significant interactions it is reasonable to 
conclude that the forecast errors defined  by  the univariate  Kalman 
filter approximate the errors that economic agents would actually make 
in practice. 
I question MR’s interpretation of table 4.12.  For example, they are 
concerned about the positive effect of prices on the base as reported 
in the first VAR in table. But in the VAR context, the price disturbance 
cannot be interpreted ceteris paribus.  The price disturbance initially 
raises BUS, but lagged BUS lowers BUS. Moreover, in the VAR for 
PUS, lagged BUS reduces PUS. Without simulating the system, it is 
impossible to see how all this will work out. MR suggest as much in 
their comment that capital flows and interest rates may have played an 
important role. It would have been possible to include interest rates in 
the VAR, but I would not hazard a guess as to the result or how to 
interpret the result once I saw it. 
MR conclude that the short- and long-term variability of both output 
and prices was higher under the gold standard than during the postwar 
years. To  support this  conclusion  it would  be helpful  if  MR  would 
report results in tables 4.7 and 4.8 for the Bretton Woods and fluctuating 
rates periods  combined. To  my taste there are too few observations 
under floating rates to have great confidence in statistical results for 
this period. As MR note when discussing the average rate of inflation 
under floating rates, it is misleading to attribute the economic ills of 
the 1970s to the floating rate system; these ills were, in part, left over 
from Bretton Woods. 
My  suspicion is that MR’s conclusion on variability  is correct for 
output, but probably not for prices. Table 4.8, as  it stands, is essentially 
a draw, but the inflation section of table 4.3 leaves the gold standard a 
clear winner.  The two gold standard subperiods defined in  table 4.3 
each delivered average inflation rates closer to zero than did the Bretton 
Woods  and floating rate periods.  Economic welfare  depends on the 
average inflation  rate as well as on inflation  forecast errors, perhaps 
because in practice economies do not fully adjust to ongoing inflation. 
MR do not attempt to weight the price and output results to arrive 
at an overall welfare judgment. There is reason, however, to emphasize 
the price results. The argument is not that price stability is more im- 
portant than  output stability,  but  that we are comparing  alternative 
monetary systems rather than alternative output systems, such as cen- 
tral planning versus the market. The monetary system is the primary 
determinant of  price performance, but perhaps only a minor determi- 
nant of output performance. There is certainly a substantial amount of 
evidence that output growth  and inflation  are, at best, very  weakly 
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There is another way to put this point. If  the gold standard did not 
deliver price stability, then the argument is over. But it is reasonable 
to conclude that the gold standard did deliver price stability in greater 
measure than other approaches tried since 1914. The stability was not 
as great as the gold enthusiasts would have us believe, but for the 
reasons I have discussed, the stability was probably greater than MR 
have concluded. 
I agree with MR  that the case for mean reversion of the price level 
under  the gold  standard  is  not  strong, at  least  in  terms  of  a  strict 
interpretation of that hypothesis. The first part of the classical period 
involved deflation and the second part involved inflation. If  the claim 
is  that the  deflation caused an  increase in  gold production and  the 
subsequent inflation, then these data by  themselves contain too few 
observations to test the hypothesis. The mean reversion hypothesis 
should not be taken literally anyway. There is no reason whatsoever 
to believe that the equilibrium relative price of gold is a constant. 
But the case for the gold  standard does not  rest on the fact that 
inflation from  1896 to 1913 cancelled out deflation from 1873 to 1896. 
Either of these periods  taken separately exhibited  satisfactory price 
performance by  today’s standards. The average  rate  of  inflation or 
deflation was relatively low. The year-to-year variability appears high 
by today’s standards, but that is at least partly illusory. Some of the 
greater variability of the inflation rate in the nineteenth century reflects 
the relatively narrow scope of  available price indexes, while some of 
the apparent smoothness of postwar inflation reflects an ex post rather 
than an ex ante calculation of  the average inflation rate. That is the 
point of  MR’s Kalman filter analysis, and it shows up in the results 
reported in table 4.8. 
I agree with MR’s skepticism that long-term price predictability pro- 
motes investment in  durable capital.  Most  of  us believe that  a less 
predictable price level must surely lead to a less efficient allocation of 
resources, but  the methods available to hedge price  surprises seem 
extensive enough to keep the costs relatively low. Distributional ef- 
fects, which seem to be fairly random across income classes, are greater 
and they are probably the source of much of the political dissatisfaction 
caused by unstable prices. Issues of  equity and political stability are 
outside the scope of the MR  paper, but given their broad overview of 
the subject, brief mention of these issues seems in order. 
MR comment that the costs of maintaining long-term price predict- 
ability include those arising from returning to an established parity, as 
with Britain in 1821 and 1925. There are economic costs in these cases, 
but MR emphasize that there are benefits to wealthowners in the form 
of protection from confiscatory actions of  government. I would add 
that  there  are also broad  political benefits for any government that 
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break its economic commitments without raising questions about its 
reliability in other areas, such as its reliability as a treaty partner. 
Finally, we should be careful to select appropriate criteria upon which 
to judge the gold standard. Early in the paper MR  argue that, “[iln 
place of the long-term commitment to a fixed nominal exchange rate 
of domestic money for gold, countries could have made a commitment 
to a  stable expected price  level.”  Given  the state of  knowledge  of 
monetary economics in the nineteenth century, the gold standard was 
the logical arrangement to achieve a stable expected price level. Al- 
though the gold standard is, I believe, no longer a suitable monetary 
system, the fact that reputable economists and not just cranks believe 
that the gold standard is worthy of serious consideration  even today 
is a tribute to the system. 
Note 
I. The Meltzer-Robinson paper was revised several times after the confer- 
ence, as  was my  discussion.  I  regard  my interchange  with  the authors as 
unusually  fruitful, and  wish  to  thank them for being  so  responsive to my 
comments and for their useful suggestions on my written discussion. However, 
the standard disclaimer applies: errors in my discussion are my responsibility 
(and errors in their paper are their responsibility). 
General Discussion 
MCCALLUM  doubted the finding of long-run inflation unpredictability 
under the gold standard. In terms of an ARIMA formulation, this disbe- 
lief  amounts to skepticism  that inflation  rates were not  covariance 
stationary-that  it was necessary to second difference the log of the 
price level. He presented evidence suggesting that second differencing 
was not necessary.  He described the results of some ARIMA calcu- 
lations, estimating (0,3,2) models and also very simple models-(O,l  ,I) 
and (1,l ,O)-that  use first differences of the log of the price level for 
five countries excluding Italy, which was not on the gold standard, and 
Japan, for which  he did not  have the data. In all these cases, very 
simple  first-difference  models  outperformed  the  second-difference 
models  in  the sense that, basically,  they  are equivalent  in  terms of 
explanatory power. So there is no advantage to the more general spec- 
ification.  Thus,  at the  level  of  an  ARIMA  analysis, according  to 
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in  favor  of  the  second-difference  formulation,  which  the  Meltzer- 
Robinson setup represents. Furthermore, he conjectured that second 
differencing the data would be as inappropriate for Kalman filter models 
as he found it to be for the ARIMA models. 
Finally, he pointed out that estimation of an ARIMA (0,2,2)  model, 
as in equation (8) of the paper, revealed that for four out of five countries 
the sign of the second moving average coefficient was opposite to that 
predicted by the model. 
MELTZER  responded that, based on a comparison of ARIMA models 
on line to the multistate  Kalman filter model on line, in most cases, 
the multistate Kalman filter had lower standard errors of forecast than 
the other models. [These results are reported in the published version 
of  the paper.] He also pointed out that the calculations should not be 
interpreted as a statement about the gold standard but about the per- 
formance of the gold standard relative to other standards. 
STEIN  suggested looking at the variation of output around capacity 
output  as a measure of  the ability of different  regimes to adjust to 
monetary shocks. He doubted the Meltzer-Robinson conclusion that 
price predictability was any better under floating rates than in previous 
periods, citing a paper by  Robert Barro in  the Journal of Business 
(1986) that  showed  interest  rates to be  poor  predictors of  inflation, 
particularly after 1971. 
B. FRIEDMAN  pointed out that the Kuznets-type of  GNP estimates 
used in the study were based  on the components of GNP that were 
likely to be the most variable. He suggested the use of  Christina Ro- 
mer’s new industrial production and GNP estimates. He also wondered 
whether sectoral shifts in the composition of  economic activity over 
time would be  in  the  direction of  dampening fluctuations-that  the 
greater degree of variability during the gold standard period may be 
due, in part, to the higher share of agriculture relative to manufacturing 
and  services in  total production during that  period.  [The published 
version of the paper finds this not to be the case.] 
WOOD  wondered how evidence that long-term bond yields exhibited 
much greater stability under the gold standard than in the past thirty- 
five years could be reconciled  with the conclusion of the paper that 
price unpredictability was higher under the gold standard than in  the 
recent period, particularly bearing in mind the stability of the real rate 
of interest that Friedman and Schwartz reported in Monetary Trends. 
MELTZER  responded that looking at the actual movements of interest 
rates cannot tell you much about unanticipated variability. 
KOCHIN  made the point that an investor in  1910  would have been 
trying to predict the price level in  1919, not the conditional predicted 
price level assuming that the world gold standard would persist to 1919. 
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For ten-year forecasts of the price level, the chance of going off the 
gold standard was always significant. All transitions off the gold stan- 
dard are ignored in  this  study since data off  the gold  standard was 
excluded. 
Moreover, comparing periods when the world was on the gold stan- 
dard with those when it was not, biases the case in favor of  the gold 
standard because it is a system which, when there is a big shock such 
as World War I, the world will abandon. The paper thus compares one 
data set where the shocks are excluded with another where the shocks 
are included. 
MELTZER  responded that the Kalman filter gives an on-line forecast, 
and to the extent that such factors entered into people’s heads, it should 
affect the permanent shock or the rho component. To the extent that 
it is there and is systematic, it is taken out as anticipated. 
B. FRIEDMAN  suggested  that  the authors include  measures  of  the 
actual variability of monetary growth, inflation, and real output growth 
as a benchmark for comparison to the forecast errors. [The final draft 
of the paper incorporates this suggestion.] 
WHITE  suggested that, in order not to bias the historical comparison 
between  the gold  standard and fiat money regimes, one would also 
want to include fiat money episodes that have blown up, for example, 
the interwar period. 
CHOUDHRI  made the point that the difference between the standards 
may be due to measurement errors or real shocks. But these errors or 
shocks might be country specific, due, e.g., to Japan, so that an in- 
teresting test might be to compare the variance of errors across countries. 
CARLINER  suggested that the variability of prices and output over 
time might depend on common forces affecting all countries, such as 
improvements in the technology of financial systems or the shift out 
of agriculture. 
LAIDLER  doubted that, during the gold standard period, agents could 
satisfactorily predict prices and output in  the way the paper assumes 
they were doing. The historical data used today were not available to 
them at the time. This, he argued, is an example of a problem that is 
always present when one uses historical data. We  know much more 
about what  is going on in historical  time series than did the agents 
whose behavior generated them. 
MELTZER  responded that such a line of criticism pertains to all his- 
torical research. He pointed out that the data available to agents, at 
least for the  1920s, were not  that different from what are available 
today. 